We examine the impact of the cross-listing status of target firms and cross-country institutional differences on short-and long-run performance of US bidders in cross-border acquisitions. We find that lower integration of the target market to global economies and higher cultural differences result in higher bidders' announcement-period returns when acquiring firms crosslisted in the US. This result suggests that cross-listing may play a significant role in lowering the acquisition costs induced by market segmentation. Moreover, we show that acquirers realize higher long-run returns when acquiring foreign targets cross-listed on US markets, suggesting a more successful post-merger integration and greater merger synergies. We also provide further evidence for the hypothesis of corporate governance transfer through mergers and acquisitions by examining its effects on acquirers' short and long-run returns. We show that, on the long-run, the acquirer benefits from transferring its good corporate governance practices to the target.
Introduction
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have experienced a tremendous rise during the last decade, alimented by increasing globalization and integration in financial markets. While this trend may suggest that such transactions generate substantial gains, the evidence points out that they are not very successful and concerns are growing over the ability of firms to conduct the post-merger integration. Several studies have examined the wealth effects to target and acquiring shareholders in cross-border M&As (e.g., Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) . One particular issue that aroused a great interest is whether M&As create value for the acquirer or do target shareholders capture almost the entire gain.
While there is extensive evidence of a significant positive wealth effect for target shareholders, results vary in the case of acquiring shareholders. In general, research shows that, in comparison to domestic transactions, cross-border ones are less beneficial to shareholders of the acquiring firm. For instance, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) report a significant lower stock market reaction to acquisition announcements for US acquirers engaged in cross-border deals compared to domestic ones. They further uncover a significant lower improvement in longrun operating performance for acquirers in cross-border deals when compared to acquirers that dealt with domestic targets. These findings suggest that cross-border M&As are embedded with significant challenges, especially during the post-acquisition integration process.
In a cross-border context, M&A transactions are more challenging on several grounds. First, differences in financial disclosure and accounting standards increase uncertainty and complexity of pricing the foreign target. Second, the post-merger integration process is more problematic because of disparities in country characteristics between the acquirer and the target. These disparities stem primarily from differences in national and corporate culture, in corporate governance practices, and in regulatory environments. For instance, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) find that acquirer gains are higher for transactions involving target countries with a legal system offering better shareholder rights.
For US acquirers seeking cross-border targets, firms cross-listed in the US may be more convenient targets as they may reduce the impact of the aforementioned country disparities and alleviate the barriers resulting from market segmentation. In their comprehensive review of the recent research on cross-listings, Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) assert that cross-listings "still represent an important force for the integration of global financial markets". Indeed, crosslisting brings greater transparency and visibility that may advantage cross-border acquirers.
Specifically, information asymmetries for potential acquirers are reduced as a result of enhanced disclosure and increased analyst coverage (Lang et al., 2003) . This yields higher forecast accuracy and more precise valuation of the target. Furthermore, cross-listing increases foreign firms' visibility on US markets and introduces them to US corporate culture and standards, which decreases the home bias for US acquirers and reduces potential cultural problems that may arise during the merger integration. In that respect, acquisitions of foreign cross-listed firms by US acquirers may share more common attributes with domestic US acquisitions than with crossborder ones, thereby generating higher acquirer returns. This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we examine the gains to acquiring shareholders in domestic and cross-border M&As, shedding light on the wealth effect resulting from the cross-listing status of the target firm, an effect that has not yet been examined in the literature. By doing so, we provide new evidence for the role of cross-listing in promoting market integration through the reduction in costs of international corporate investments, in terms of agency costs, transparency, information asymmetries and corporate governance. To appraise these gains, we consider two measures: (1) the stock market reaction to merger announcement and, (2) the long-term abnormal returns, a proxy for the post-merger integration success. We consider an extensive sample of 14,168 acquisitions conducted by US acquirers over the period 1990 through 2010. Our specific purpose is to compare the returns to shareholders of US firms that acquire foreign firms cross-listed in the US as opposed to non-cross-listed ones.
Second, we contribute to the recent literature that advocates international convergence of corporate governance through cross-border M&As (e.g. Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Bris et al. 2008; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) . This literature argues that target firms with poor corporate governance benefit from a transfer of good governance practices when acquired by firms with better corporate governance. Existing studies on the wealth effect of corporate governance convergence focus on target shareholders' gains and show that these gains are positively related to the differences in corporate governance between acquirer and target countries (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Bris et al. 2008 ). We go beyond these studies by investigating whether the corporate governance transfer in cross-border M&As creates value to acquiring shareholders. Furthermore, while the extant literature focuses on announcement-period returns, we examine the effects of corporate governance transfer on both announcement-period and post-merger long-run returns. The latter measure enables us to assess the wealth effect from corporate governance transfer, assuming acquirers' long-run returns would reflect the actual synergistic gains following the acquisition. In contrast, announcement-period returns would reflect only investors' expectations about potential synergistic gains from the acquisition.
Our results show that US bidders in cross-border M&As underperform domestic ones on both short and long terms. We find evidence supporting the role of cross-listing in alleviating the acquisition costs induced by market segmentation and cross-country cultural disparities.
Specifically, we find that the more segmented is the target market and the higher are cultural differences, the higher are the bidder's announcement-period returns when acquiring targets cross-listed on US markets. On the long-run, our results show a positive and significant impact of the cross-listing status of the target on acquirer's returns, especially for targets cross-listed on US exchanges, suggesting that these firms generate higher synergies and are easier and less expensive to integrate into US acquirers' business and structures. When examining the effect of corporate governance variables, we find consistent evidence supporting the corporate governance transfer hypothesis through its effect on acquirer's long-term returns. In particular, the lower is the shareholder protection in the target country, the higher is the acquirer's long-run performance in full acquisitions, suggesting the positive effect from corporate governance transfer.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature and the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample construction and the variables used in the analysis, while section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Related literature and hypothesis development
Before developing our hypotheses related to the cross-listing effect, we discuss the factors explaining the observed differences in acquirers' wealth gains between cross-border and domestic acquisitions. The same factors are likely to explain a potential cross-listing effect since cross-listed targets may present more similarities with domestic US targets than with their non-cross-listed peers. These factors are related to target country institutional characteristics, information asymmetries, cultural differences and market integration.
Target country characteristics, information asymmetry and valuation of the target
In cross-border M&As, the valuation of the target is a major challenge. Indeed, imperfect information makes the valuation of foreign targets less accurate, particularly targets from countries with weak accounting and disclosure standards. As a result, the market reacts negatively to this uncertainty, generating lower returns to acquirers. Moreover, agency costs arising from information asymmetries between shareholders and managers may be greater in foreign acquisitions than in domestic ones. For instance, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) find that announcement-period returns to US acquirers are significantly lower when target countries are characterized with a more restrictive capital market, weaker corporate governance, and a less active takeover market.
Some other studies point in the opposite direction, arguing for higher bidder returns in crossborder acquisitions of targets from countries with less developed capital markets and less protection of shareholder rights. Such countries are characterized with higher cost of capital and lower equity valuation, thus resulting in a higher extraction of wealth by the acquirer (Black et al., 2007) . Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that the market for corporate control is less active and less competitive in countries with lower levels of investor protection. As a result of lower competition, acquirers are able to pay lower premiums to target shareholders and thereby capture higher gains from acquisitions.
Corporate governance convergence
Several papers advocate the international convergence of corporate governance through cross-border M&As (e.g., Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Bris et al., 2008) . This hypothesis posits that acquisition by better corporate governance firms result in a transfer of better corporate governance practices to the target. Therefore, one source of synergy in cross-border M&As stems from the improvement in the corporate governance of the target firm when the acquirer's corporate governance is superior to the target's. La Porta et al. (2000) argue that an important mechanism for a firm to enhance value and efficiency is its acquisition by a firm already operating in a more protective legal regime. In a study of European M&As, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) find that stronger shareholder protection in the acquirer's country relative to the target's is associated with greater post-acquisition synergistic gains. In particular, both the acquirer and the target benefit from higher announcement abnormal returns, reflecting the expected improvement of corporate governance in the target.
Cultural differences, managerial resistance and post-merger integration
Another potential problem in cross-border transactions relates to the post-acquisition integration process whose success reflects in the acquirer's long-run stock price performance.
Cultural difference between the acquirer and the target countries is an important determinant of success in cross-border M&As as it can make the combination process difficult and expensive.
These cultural barriers are likely to account for the poorer returns to acquirers in cross-border acquisitions, compared to domestic ones. For instance, Conn et al. (2005) find that cultural differences between the acquirer and the target countries in cross-border acquisitions have a negative impact on the acquirer's long-run performance. This factor becomes more crucial as the size of the target and the cultural gap increase. Furthermore, domestic acquirers who have a superior knowledge of their local market may have a better ability than foreign acquirers to generate higher post-merger synergies (e.g., Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) .
The degree of market integration
The degree of target country integration to global markets may be an important determinant of acquirer gains in cross-border M&As (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) . On one hand, a high degree of market integration offers a large investment opportunity set to acquirers, thus increasing the probability of realizing higher synergistic gains. Indeed, cross-border M&As may provide acquirers with valuable opportunities that are inaccessible through domestic acquisitions, such as enhanced technology, enlarged and less competitive product markets, reduced costs and more favorable institutional environment. Furthermore, depending on the degree of target market integration, the costs generated by the post-merger integration process and agency costs inherent to monitoring foreign operations will vary. On the other hand, a high degree of market integration may have a negative effect on cross-border acquirers. Indeed, market integration may lead to a greater competition in the market for corporate control, which would reduce the gains captured by the acquirer. In addition, the reduction in costs of cross-border M&As resulting from higher market integration may result in an increase in managerial hubris (Roll, 1986) .
Cross-listing and international acquisitions
Cross-listing on foreign markets may mitigate several of the constraints on international investments discussed above. This could benefit to both targets and acquirers in cross-border M&As. Cosset and Meknassi (2010) focus on target gains and show that cross-listed firms are more likely to be acquisition targets and obtain significantly higher takeover premiums than their non-cross-listed peers. In the same vein, acquirers can benefit from the cross-listing status of their targets in several ways. First, firms that cross-list on US exchanges gain from enhanced disclosure and increased analyst coverage (Lang et al., 2003) . This results in a more precise valuation of the target and a more accurate forecast of post-acquisition synergies. Second, firms that cross-list to raise capital have a higher growth potential. Acquirers inherit these growth opportunities which reflect into higher gains from the merger. Finally, cross-listed firms may be more convenient targets for US acquirers because of their prior knowledge of US market and culture. This helps alleviating potential cultural shocks and barriers that may arise during the post-acquisition integration.
Also, to the extent that cross-listing contributes to increasing market integration and overcoming segmenting investment barriers, and that higher market integration may yield higher synergy gains (e.g., Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) , the gains from cross-border acquisitions conducted by US firms would be better captured if the foreign target is cross-listed on US markets. With respect to all aforementioned factors, foreign firms cross-listed on US markets may constitute a superior investment opportunity, enabling US acquirers to overcome the constraints inherent to cross-border acquisitions and to increase their gains.
Data description and methodology

Sample selection
We compile our data from various sources. First, we obtain data on M&As from Thomson the matching procedure discussed in the following section, our sample is substantially reduced when considering cumulative returns over long periods. The sample size is specified in the corresponding tables for each period length.
Methodology
To estimate the gains accrued to shareholders of the acquiring firm, we consider two measures: (1) the announcement-period abnormal returns and (2) the long-run abnormal returns following the acquisition.
Announcement-period returns
We estimate the announcement-period returns using an event-study approach. We compute the market model cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for a 3-day period (-1,+1) around the announcement date. We use a 3-day window as it is commonly used in the M&A literature.
Following Moeller et al. (2004), we estimate the market model parameters over the (-205,-6) trading days preceding the announcement date, using CRSP equally-weighted index as the market index. Alternatively, we use CRSP value-weighted index to check the robustness of our results. Also, to assess the sensitivity of the results to the period's length, we use different windows to estimate acquirer CARs: [-3,3] ; [-20,-1] . Finally, we use longer windows ( [-20,20] and [-60,60] ) in order to incorporate potential effects of competition, management resistance and bid revisions that may occur after the announcement.
Long-term abnormal returns
We estimate long-run wealth effect to the acquirer using two approaches. First, we compute standard buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for each firm over the period beginning in the month following the deal completion and lasting three to five years. The BHAR is defined as the firm's cumulative return in excess of the benchmark return:
Our benchmark consists of a portfolio of non-acquiring firms matched with firm size and market-to-book ratio. The matching universe is composed of all US firms with publicly listed common shares and available return data on CRSP. We exclude firms that conducted acquisitions within the three years preceding or following the matching month. We construct reference portfolios following the methodology proposed by Lyon et al. (1999) . This approach is based on stratification by size and market-to-book ratio, as follows:
-We partition all NYSE firms into size deciles based on their market value of equity at the month-end. We then place AMEX and NASDAQ firms in the corresponding NYSE size decile.
Since most NASDAQ firms fall in the smallest size decile as they are significantly smaller on average, we further divide this decile into quintiles based on firm size. This procedure yields 14 size reference portfolios.
-We divide each of the 14 size portfolios into quintiles based on the market-to-book ratio measured at the month end. This results in 70 size/market-to-book reference portfolios.
We match each sample firm with one of the 70 portfolios that has the closest size and bookto-market ratio (between 70 and 130% of the size and market-to-book ratio of the sample firm).
Each month from 1990 to 2010, the reference portfolios are rebalanced and the matching procedure is repeated. Lyon et al. (1999) show that this approach yields well specified test statistics because it alleviates the three main sources of misspecifications inherent to reference portfolios, namely the new listing, rebalancing and skewness biases 2 (Barber and Lyon, 1997;
Kothari and Warner, 1997). However, it does not control for another common cause of misspecification encountered in long-horizon event studies, namely the cross-sectional correlation in returns which can lead to understatement of standard errors (Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000) . This problem arises from the fact that some acquirers may conduct several acquisitions within the holding period, thus resulting in overlapping returns. To overcome this problem, we exclude acquisitions that occur within three years of the completion of another acquisition by the same acquirer.
Variables definition
Beside the cross-listing dummy variables, our main variables relates to institutional characteristics at the country-level. As control variables, we use the following firm-and We use several proxies for corporate governance and shareholder protection that have been considered in the literature:
1. The anti-self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008) which measures the legal protection of minority shareholders against "managerial self-dealing" and private benefit extraction; 2. A common law dummy to identify the legal system (common versus civil law), since common law countries are characterized with stronger legal protection.
3. The accounting standards index, which measures the quality of accounting and disclosure standards.
Finally, to investigate the impact of corporate governance transfer on acquirer returns, it is important to distinguish between full and partial acquisitions. In a cross-border acquisition of 100% of the target shares (full acquisition), the target firm obtains the nationality of the acquirer and therefore becomes subject to the corporate governance system prevailing in its country (Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Martynova and Reneboog, 2008) . In this case, the corporate governance convergence from the acquirer to the target should produce its full effect. In partial takeovers, however, the acquirer may impose its corporate governance standards on the target on a voluntary basis. Therefore, if the corporate governance convergence hypothesis holds, its effect should be the most perceptible in full takeovers. We include an additional dummy variable in the regressions to identify full acquisitions. Table 1 presents means and medians of explanatory variables for both domestic and crossborder M&As. We provide test results of differences in means (t-statistics) and medians (Wilcoxon-z) between these two subsamples.
Empirical evidence
Determinants of acquirer returns: Univariate analysis
As expected and consistent with previous research (e.g., Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005), cross-border acquisitions exhibit significant disparities with domestic ones, in terms of both acquirer firm-level and deal-level characteristics. First, US firms acquiring abroad are larger in size, more overvalued, have higher levels of leverage and of free cash-flows. Also, the proportion of 100% stock-financed deals is greater among domestic M&As, suggesting that cross-border acquirers are more likely to pay with cash. This is consistent with the existence of a home bias that increases the reluctance of shareholders to hold foreign stocks and therefore prefer a cash payment. Also, the higher levels of free cash-flows available to cross-border acquirers before the acquisition enable them to finance their acquisitions with cash. In addition, our results show that cross-border targets are subject to a higher competition among acquirers, to more hostile offers and to more tender offers. Industry diversification purposes do not seem to be a significant characteristic in cross-border acquisitions compared to domestic ones. Finally, cross-border M&As coincide with significantly higher levels for the Broad Dollar Index, a result consistent with the importance of a strong currency in promoting cross-border acquisitions.
In the last three columns of In the following sections, we examine the impact of these three categories of variables (firm, deal-and country-level characteristics) on acquirers' announcement and long-run returns.
Bidder's announcement returns
Univariate analysis
To assess the short-term wealth effects to the bidder, we measure cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over different event windows around the merger announcement: [-60,60] ; [-20,20] ; [-3,3] ; [-1,1] ; in addition, we consider the price run-up preceding the announcement: [-20,-1] . We report the results using both equally-and value-weighted CRSP indices as benchmark returns. We test the significance of the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs), using the non-parametric rank test of Corrado (1989). by domestic bidders are significantly higher than those of cross-border ones. This difference is significant for (-1,+1), (-3,+3) and (-60+60) around the announcement using both value-and equally-weighted index returns. This result is in line with the findings of previous studies documenting an underperformance of cross-border acquirers relative to their domestic peers (e.g., Denis et al., 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) . (-1,+1) , (-3,+3) and (-60+60) windows for both the value-and the equally weighted index. However, this difference is statistically significant only at the 10% level for some event windows. Panel C reports CAARs for the subsample of cross-border M&As that involves targets cross-listed on US markets. We distinguish targets cross-listed on US exchanges (exchange-listed) from those cross-listed via unlisted ADR programs (non-exchange-listed). For most event windows, the difference between the two types of cross-listing is not significant, or borderline significant with acquirers earning generally higher returns when purchasing exchange-listed firms. In general, these preliminary findings do not confirm our hypothesis regarding the role of cross-listing in reducing the uncertainty surrounding international acquisitions and alleviating the cross-border discount effect.
In the following sections, we shall examine whether the cross-listing effect is significant in a multivariate setting. Since the CAARs from acquiring exchange-listed and non-exchange-listed targets do not exhibit significant differences, we will not distinguish between these two categories in the multivariate analysis of announcement-period returns.
Multivariate analysis
We start our multivariate analysis with regressions on acquirer CARs for the cross-border subsample. The dependent variable in all regressions is the cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day window around the announcement, i.e. CAR (-1,+1) . Year and industry dummies are included in all regressions but are not reported. The estimation results are presented in Table 3 .
Our results show a positive but insignificant impact of the cross-listing status of the target on US acquirer returns.
Some of our results related to transaction-and firm-level control variables are consistent with the existing literature. More specifically, we find a negative relation between the size of the acquirer and its stock market returns, suggesting that larger acquirers are more inclined to make poor acquisition decisions, which is consistent with the managerial hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986) . Both leverage and free cash-flow variables show the expected sign (positive and negative, respectively), consistent with the hypothesis that a high debt capacity and availability of free cash-flows stimulate value-decreasing decisions (Jensen, 1986) . For deal-related control variables, our results show a negative effect of equity payments on acquirer returns, consistent with the overvaluation signalling hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Also, we find that acquirer returns are significantly lower for hostile acquisitions, which is in line with the results reported by previous studies (e.g., Moeller et al., 2005) .
In specifications 3 to 6, we introduce target country characteristics. First, we find that the broad dollar index, our measure of the strength of the US dollar, have a positive and significant effect on acquirer returns in all model specifications. The positive sign is consistent with the idea that US acquirers earn higher returns when financing their cross-border investments with a strong currency. Our measure of target country integration to global markets shows an insignificant effect on acquirer returns. To investigate the impact of corporate governance transfer on acquirer returns, we need to assess the marginal impact of full acquisitions. For this purpose, we introduce the interaction between shareholder protection measures and a dummy variable that identifies full acquisitions. Specifications 5 and 6 show that the interaction effect is insignificant for both our proxies of shareholder protection even though it has the expected positive sign.
Overall, we fail to find support for a significant impact of corporate governance convergence on the announcement-period abnormal returns accrued to the acquirer. This may be due to the existence of two opposite effects that offset each other. On one hand, target countries with weaker corporate governance are characterized with higher information asymmetries, greater uncertainty and more agency costs which reflect into lower announcement-period returns to US acquirers (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) . On the other hand, the corporate governance transfer hypothesis suggests that the improvement in target's corporate governance by the acquirer is a source of synergy and therefore should yield higher announcement abnormal returns to both the acquirer and the target (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Bris et al., 2008) . It remains very challenging to disentangle the effects of these two opposed factors on acquirer returns.
In the last three columns of Table 3 , we examine whether previous results with respect to the impact of institutional variables differ for the subsample of cross-listed targets. Our results show that the degree of target country's integration to global markets has a significant negative effect on US acquirer returns. In other words, the more segmented is the target market, the higher is the bidder's gain when acquiring targets cross-listed on US markets. This result suggests that crosslisting may play a significant role in lowering the costs induced by market segmentation, in terms of agency and monitoring costs and information asymmetries, thus resulting in higher returns to the acquirer. Finally, the other institutional variables measuring the level of shareholder protection in the target country have no significant effect on acquirer returns. Table 3 about here ***
*** Insert
Additional robustness tests on announcement returns
To check the robustness of our results, we conduct additional tests on the announcementperiod abnormal returns 4 .
Alternative event window:
To test the robustness of our results to the announcement-period, we re-estimate previous regressions using acquirer CARs over the [-3,+3] and [-5 ,+5] windows as the dependent variable. Unreported results show that the impact of the cross-listing status of the target on acquirer returns is still positive but insignificant. When considering institutional variables, our proxy for the strength of the US dollar shows a more significant positive effect on acquirer returns for the [-3 ,+3] window, confirming our previous finding that US acquirers earn higher returns when financing their cross-border acquisitions with a strong currency. Finally, both our measures of shareholder protection still exhibit a positive but insignificant effect for full acquisitions. The positive sign is consistent with the corporate governance transfer hypothesis.
Selection bias correction:
Since our sample regressions only include cross-border acquisitions, it is important to control for the selection bias arising from the acquirer's decision to conduct a cross-border acquisition rather than a domestic one. Ignoring this potential problem may yield biased estimates. Many factors influence this decision and are mainly related to the higher uncertainty and combination costs inherent to cross-border M&As, which will in turn influence acquirer returns. To correct for this bias, we use Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure.
In the first-step, we estimate a probit model for the decision to undertake a cross-border rather than a domestic acquisition (the selection equation) using the sample of all domestic and crossborder acquisitions. The estimated parameters are then used to compute the inverse Mill's ratio (lambda) which is included in the second stage regressions on bidder returns (the outcome equation). We model the decision to make a cross-border rather than a domestic acquisition as a function of both acquirer's firm-level characteristics and target country's level of shareholder protection, accounting standards and disclosure (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) . We also include our proxy for the level of target market integration to global economies as it may influence the bidder's decision to acquire abroad rather than domestically.
The results of the first and second-step regressions are presented in Table 4 . The estimates of the selection equation show that US bidders are more likely to acquire abroad rather than domestically when the target country is more integrated to global markets, which is consistent with the belief that market integration contribute to promoting cross-border M&As. In addition, US bidders are more inclined to acquire foreign firms from countries where a low regulatory environment prevails. The second-stage regressions show that the correction for the selfselection bias may be relevant since the coefficient associated with lambda is significant in both specifications 2 and 4. The coefficient of the cross-listing dummy increases in magnitude in all specifications but is still statistically insignificant. Finally, our results show a positive and significant effect of the difference in anti-self-dealing levels between the US and the target country only for full acquisitions, which supports the corporate governance transfer hypothesis. Table 4 about here ***
*** Insert
The impact of cultural and geographic proximity: We re-estimate previous regressions on acquirer's announcement returns, while controlling for the degree of cultural similarities and geographic proximity between the acquirer and the target countries. These two factors may provide a higher information advantage for the acquirer, resulting in higher returns. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) find results supporting this argument for European acquirers. We obtain data on geographical and cultural proximity from Sarkissian and Schill (2004): Geographic proximity is the distance between the capital cities of the acquirer and the target countries, taken with a negative sign. Cultural proximity is a dummy variable that equals one if either both the acquirer and the target countries share the same language or if the target was historically part of the same colonial empire as the acquirer.
In unreported regressions on returns over both (-1,+1) and (-3 ,+3) windows, we find that cultural proximity has a positive and significant effect on acquirer returns, suggesting that the acquisition of a firm sharing a similar culture enhances value creation. Geographic proximity, however, does not exhibit a significant effect on acquirer returns. Additional regressions (unreported) on the subsample of cross-listed targets reveal interesting results: The effect of cultural proximity on acquirer returns is negative and significant for both event windows, meaning that the higher are cultural disparities between the acquirer and the target, the higher are acquirer returns. In other words, cross-listing helps alleviating the negative effect of cultural differences in cross-border M&As, thus resulting in higher announcement-period returns for acquiring shareholders. This result provides further evidence for the role of cross-listing in reducing the constraints from cross-country differences and promoting cross-border M&As.
To sum up, our results do not support our hypothesis of a significant effect of the crosslisting status of foreign targets on US acquirers' announcement-period returns. However, we find evidence supporting the belief that cross-listing helps alleviating the constraints resulting from market segmentation and cultural disparities, thus resulting in higher returns for cross-border acquirers. Also, we provide some evidence for a positive impact of potential corporate governance transfer on acquirer's announcement-period returns. In the following section, we examine the effect of these factors on acquirer's long-run returns.
Bidder's long-run stock price performance
Univariate analysis
We compute buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for acquiring firms over the period beginning in the month following the deal completion and lasting one to five years. As described previously, the benchmark consists of a portfolio of non-acquiring firms matched with size and market-to-book ratio following the methodology of Lyon et al. (1999) .
Panel A of Table 5 Considering acquirers' long-run returns following the acquisition as a proxy for the postacquisition integration success, cross-listed firms may be more convenient targets as they require lower combination costs in terms of agency costs, information asymmetries, and post-acquisition restructuring, compared to their non-cross-listed counterparts.
Panel C depicts BHARs for the subsample of cross-border M&As involving targets crosslisted on US markets. We distinguish targets cross-listed on US exchanges (exchange-listed) from those cross-listed via unlisted ADR programs (non-exchange-listed). Our results show that
over the two to four-years holding periods, acquirers targeting non-exchange-listed firms incur significantly lower returns compared to exchange-listed targets. Over one to two-years holding period, non-exchange-listed targets yield even negative returns to acquirers. This evidence is in line with our hypothesis that firms cross-listed on US exchanges may be more suitable targets for US acquirers.
To sum up, our results provide consistent evidence for a positive effect on US acquirers' long-run returns when their targets are cross-listed on US exchanges. We examine in the following section whether this evidence still holds when controlling for other factors in a multivariate setting. Table 5 about here ***
*** Insert
Multivariate analysis
To test our hypothesis in a multivariate context, we conduct a set of OLS regressions on the abnormal buy-and-hold returns over a three-year period. The unavailability of data on long-run returns for non-US targets reduces our sample to 906 cross-border acquisitions conducted by US acquirers. We correct for clustering at the target country level in all regressions and use robust standard errors. Year and industry dummy variables are included in all regressions but are not reported.
The estimation results are reported in Table 6 . The impact of the exchange-listing status of the target on long-run returns to US acquirers is positive and significant across all specifications. This is consistent with our hypothesis that foreign firms cross-listed on US exchanges are more convenient targets for US acquirers since the post-acquisition integration process should be easier and less expensive when acquiring firms that are already subject to US regulation (exchange-listed firms). Most of our results related to control variables at the firm-and deallevels are consistent with the existing literature. In specifications 2 to 4, we examine whether country differences in the legal environment and shareholder protection affect acquirers' longterm performance. First, while our proxy of target market integration to global economies has no significant impact on acquirer's returns at the announcement (as shown in the previous section), it shows now a positive and significant effect on acquirer's long-run returns. This is consistent with the belief that higher market integration increases acquirer gains by lowering the postmerger integration costs (agency, monitoring, etc.).
Second, the difference between the US and the target country's characteristics for both our measures of shareholder protection exhibit a positive but insignificant effect on acquirer returns.
However, to investigate the impact of potential corporate governance transfer, we introduce the interaction between this difference in shareholder protection measures and a dummy variable that identifies full acquisitions. As discussed previously, the corporate governance transfer produces its full effect in acquisitions of 100% of the target. Specifications 3 and 4 show that the interaction effect is positive and significant for both our proxies of shareholder protection, indicating that the lower is shareholder protection in the target country, the higher are acquirers' long-run returns for full acquisitions. This result provides support to the corporate governance convergence hypothesis: the improvement in target's corporate governance by the acquirer is considered as a source of post-acquisition synergy and results into higher long-run returns to the acquirer. Table 6 about here ***
*** Insert
Additional robustness tests on long-run performance
We carry out a set of robustness tests to provide further support to our findings regarding the long-run stock price performance of US acquirers.
Alternative event window:
We re-estimate previous regressions using BHARs over a fiveyear period following the merger completion. Since the estimation period is longer, our sample is reduced to 606 cross-border acquisitions conducted by US acquirers. The impact of the crosslisting status of the target (in particular the exchange-listing) on long-run returns to US acquirers is still positive and significant. Furthermore, our previous results regarding the effect of shareholder protection levels still hold. Specifically, the interaction with the dummy variable identifying full acquisitions is positive and significant for both our proxies of shareholder protection, suggesting that the lower is the shareholder protection level in the target country, the higher are acquirer long-run returns for full acquisitions. This result provides further support to the corporate governance transfer hypothesis.
Selection bias correction:
As for short-term regressions, we correct for the selection bias arising from the acquirer's decision to conduct a cross-border acquisition rather than a domestic one using a similar procedure. Unreported regression results on both three-and five-year period BHARs show that the introduction of the inverse Mill's ratio (Lambda) did not affect our main results regarding the positive effect of the cross-listing status of the target on acquirers' long-run returns. In addition, both our measures of corporate governance in the target country exhibit slightly changed coefficient estimates. The coefficient associated with lambda is significant only for the five-year period length, suggesting that the correction for self-selection bias may be relevant.
The impact of cultural and geographic proximity:
We re-run previous regressions on acquirers' long-run returns, while controlling for cultural and geographic proximity between the acquirer and the target countries. We use data from Sarkissian and Schill (2004) as described previously. Table 7 presents the estimation results for both three-and five-year period BHAR.
Our results for the entire sample of cross-border M&As show a positive and significant effect of cultural proximity on acquirer's returns for both period lengths. Geographic proximity shows a positive effect only for the five-year period. This result is in line with the belief that cultural similarities between the acquirer and the target increase merger synergies and play a significant role in the post-merger integration success.
Regressions on the subsample of cross-listed targets show that the effect of cultural proximity on acquirer long-run returns becomes negative and significant at the 10% level for the three-year period. This result suggests that higher cultural differences between the acquirer and the target countries do not impact negatively the post-merger integration success of cross-listed targets. In other words, the target's presence in the acquirer's country through a prior cross-listing attenuates the negative impact of cultural shocks that may arise during merger-integration.
Again, this result provides additional evidence for the role of cross-listing in alleviating the constraints from cultural disparities in cross-border M&As and facilitating the post-merger integration process. Table 7 about here ***
*** Insert
Conclusion
Using an extensive sample of domestic and cross-border acquisitions conducted by US acquirers, we assess short-and long-run returns to acquiring firms and investigate their determinants. We focus on the impact of the cross-listing status of the target and cross-country institutional differences on acquirer returns. First, consistent with previous research, our results
show that US bidders in cross-border M&As underperform domestic ones in both short and longterms. Second, while we do not find a significant effect of the cross-listing status of the target on acquirer's announcement-period returns, our results for long-run returns show a positive effect, especially for exchange-listed targets, suggesting that these firms are easier and less costly to integrate into US acquirers' structures.
We also contribute to the growing literature on corporate governance transfer through crossborder M&As by investigating its impact on market reaction at merger's announcement and long-run performance. Our results regarding the long-run effects of corporate governance differences are new and provide further evidence on the corporate governance transfer hypothesis. Specifically, we find that lower shareholder protection in the target country is associated with higher acquirer's long-run performance, suggesting that in the long run, the acquirer benefits from transferring its good corporate governance practices to the target. Our results show no significant impact of corporate governance differences on acquirer's announcement-period returns.
Furthermore, when examining the impact of target market integration to global economies, we find that acquirers' announcement-period returns are higher when acquiring cross-listed targets originated from weakly integrated markets. This result suggests that cross-listing may play a significant role in alleviating the constraints induced by market segmentation. These constraints involve lower investment opportunities available to acquirers, more costly postacquisition integration process, and higher agency and monitoring costs resulting from higher information asymmetries. The sample consists of 11,615 domestic and 2,553 cross-border transactions conducted by US acquirers over the period. Exchange-listed are firms cross-listed on organized exchanges via ADRs or direct listings; Nonexchange-listed are firms cross-listed OTC or via Rule 144a ADRs. The significance of the differences in means and medians is assessed using t-test and Wilcoxon-test respectively. Acquirer firm-level variables, measured at the beginning of the year, are: size, the logarithm of market capitalization; Tobin's Q, (book value of assets + market capitalization -book value of equity)/book value of assets; leverage, the ratio of total debt to total assets; FCF, the ratio of free cash-flows to total assets. Transaction-level variables are: all equity, equals 1 if the transaction is a 100% stock financed and 0 otherwise; contested bid, equals 1 if the number of bidders is greater than 1 and 0 otherwise; hostile, equals 1 if the transaction is classified as hostile or unsolicited and 0 otherwise; tender offer, equals 1 if the deal involves a tender offer and 0 otherwise; same industry, equals 1 if the acquirer and the target operate in the same sector and 0 otherwise; Target country-level variables are: concentration, a measure for ownership concentration at the country-level from La Porta et al. (2006); market integration, a proxy for the degree of integration of the target country to global markets; anti-self-dealing, an index from Djankov et al. (2008) measuring the degree of legal protection of minority shareholders; shareholder protection, a measure for shareholder protection from La Porta et al. (1998) . The Broad Index is a proxy for the strength of the US dollar. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (-205,-6 ) window relative to the announcement day. The market index is CRSP equally or value weighted index. The non-parametric rank test of Corrado (1989) and the two-tailed t-statistics are reported in parenthesis to test the significance of CAARs and average differences between the subgroups respectively. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Appendix. Variable Definitions and Sources
Variables
All
Panel
Value weighted (-20,-1) 0.59% -0.05% 0.64% * 0.11% -1.10% * 1.21% ** -0.49% -2.22% *** 1.73% * (0.45) (-0.55 (-60,+60) -3.32% *** -4.99% *** 1.67% ** -5.02% *** -4.52% ** -0.50% ** -4.49% *** -4.30% *** -0.19% (-5.32 ) (-4.26) (1.98) (-3.72 ) (-3.15 ) (-1.97 ) (-3.63 ) (-3.21 ) (-0.72) Equally weighted (-20,- (-20,+20) 0.63% 0.49% ** 0.14% 0.65% ** -0.27% 0.92% * -0.05% -0.67% 0.62% (1.05) (2.10) (0.24) (2.01) (-0.17) (1.79) (-0 .02) (-1.57) (1.31) (-60,+60) -1.70% *** -2.04% *** 0.34% ** -2.17% *** -1.32% * -0.85% * -0.98% * -2.03% *** 1.05% * (-4 .05) (-3.47) (1.98) (-3 .01) (-1.84 ) (-1.73 ) (-1.86 ) (-2.75 period. The dependent variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return around the announcement day (CAR(-1,+1)) measured using the market model, with CRSP value weighted index as the market index. Cross-listed is a dummy variable to identify target firms cross-listed on US markets at the moment of the acquisition whether through exchange or nonexchange listings. Acquirer firm-level variables, measured at the beginning of the year, are: size, the logarithm of market capitalization; Tobin's Q, (book value of assets + market capitalization -book value of equity)/book value of assets; leverage, the ratio of total debt to total assets; FCF, the ratio of free cash-flows to total assets. Transactionlevel variables are: all equity, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is a 100% stock financed and 0 otherwise; contested bid, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the number of bidders is greater than 1 and 0 otherwise; hostile, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is classified as hostile or unsolicited and 0 otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal involves a tender offer and 0 otherwise; same industry, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and the target operate in the same sector and 0 otherwise; full acquisition, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer owns 100% of the target shares after the acquisition. Target country-level variables are: concentration, a measure for ownership concentration at the country-level from La Porta et al. (2006); market integration, a proxy for the degree of integration of the target country to global markets; diff anti-self-dealing (US-Target) , the difference in anti-self-dealing levels (from Djankov et al., 2008) between the US and the target country; diff shareholder protection (US-Target) , the difference in shareholder protection levels (from La Porta et al., 1998) between the US and the target country. The Broad Dollar Index is a proxy for the strength of the US dollar. Year, region and industry dummies (at one-digit SIC code level) are included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the firm-level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
All cross-border M&As Cross-listed targets (-3 .02) (-3 .00) (-3 .29) (-3 .45) (-3 BHARs are computed as the firm's cumulative return in excess of the benchmark return over the period beginning in the month following the deal completion and lasting one to five years. The benchmark consists of a portfolio of non-acquiring firms matched with size and market-to-book ratio following the methodology of Lyon et al. (1999) . The significance of the differences in means and medians is assessed using t-test and Wilcoxon-test respectively. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. period. The dependent variable is the BHAR over 3 years after the deal completion. Exchange-listed is a dummy variable identifying ADRs listed on organized exchanges and via direct listings; non-exchange-listed is a dummy variable identifying ADRs listed OTC or via Rule 144a. Acquirer firm-level variables are: size, the logarithm of market capitalization; M/B, the ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity; CAR (-1,1) , the cumulative average abnormal returns to the acquirer around the acquisition announcement computed using the market model. Transaction-level variables are: all equity, equals 1 if the transaction is a 100% stock financed and 0 otherwise; tender offer, equals 1 if the deal involves a tender offer and 0 otherwise; same industry, equals 1 if the acquirer and the target operate in the same sector and 0 otherwise; full acquisition, equals 1 if the acquirer owns 100% of the target shares after the acquisition. Target country-level variables are: market integration, a proxy for the degree of integration of the target country to global markets; diff anti-self-dealing (US-Target) and diff shareholder protection (US-Target) , the differences in anti-self-dealing and shareholder protection levels respectively between the US and the target country. Year, region and industry dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the firm-level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Acquirer firm-level variables, measured at the beginning of the year, are: size, the logarithm of market capitalization; M/B, the ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity; CAR (-1,1) , the cumulative average abnormal returns to the acquirer over a three-day period around the acquisition announcement computed using the market model with CRSP value weighted index being the market index. Transaction-level variables are: all equity, equals 1 if the transaction is a 100% stock financed and 0 otherwise; tender offer, equals 1 if the deal involves a tender offer and 0 otherwise; same industry, equals 1 if the acquirer and the target operate in the same sector and 0 otherwise; full acquisition, equals 1 if the acquirer owns 100% of the target shares after the acquisition. Target country-level variables are: market integration, a proxy for the degree of integration of the target country to global markets computed as the adjusted R² from regressions of the market index return on global factors; Geographic proximity is the distance between the capitals of the acquirer and target countries, taken with a negative sign; Cultural proximity is a dummy variable that equals one if either both the acquirer and the target countries share the same language or if the target was historically part of the same colonial empire as the acquirer. Year, region and industry dummies (at one-digit SIC code level) are included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the firm-level. 
